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Do WTO rules preclude industrial policy? 
Evidence from the global economic crisis
Abstract: The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 was a 
landmark in the development of the liberal international economic order. Yet the 
global economic crisis of 2008 put the spotlight on the longstanding question 
whether WTO membership limited the policy choices of governments coping with 
distress. This Special Issue of Business and Politics uses the crisis as a “stress 
test” for evaluating the prominent thesis that multilateral trade rules presently 
impose sharp limits on national industrial policies. The evidence from a wide 
range of sectoral and national contexts suggests that the WTO’s ability to con-
strain member governments’ use of industrial policy is highly exaggerated. As we 
argue in this introductory essay, and as the studies in this Issue show, assertions 
of the WTO’s strength do not reflect the incomplete and contested nature of its 
accords and the imperatives of policymaking in an era when many governments 
simultaneously intervene in national economies.
DOI 10.1515/bap-2014-0040
1  Introduction
The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 was a landmark 
in the development of the liberal international economic order. For some, the 
establishment of the WTO represented a significant advance towards a system 
of enforceable rules for global commerce that limits the power of governments 
to discriminate against foreign commercial interests and to act in an arbitrary 
and non-transparent manner. For others, WTO accords further reduced barri-
ers to international commerce and improved the allocation of resources. At the 
time, these positive assessments were countered by both analysts and activists 
that new WTO rules and its binding Dispute Settlement Understanding would 
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ultimately eviscerate national environmental, food and product safety, and 
industrial policies, amongst others.
While there were in the WTO’s early years a number of high profile clashes 
between its members concerning trade restrictions (justified in some cases on 
environmental grounds), WTO dispute settlement has not resulted in the wide-
spread gutting of national regulations. Moreover, dozens of states have sought to 
join the WTO and none have left, which is hard to square with sweeping assess-
ments of the constraints on governments imposed by membership.1 Earlier fears 
that WTO rules were inherently biased against state intervention per se – which 
is to be distinguished from state measures that discriminate against foreign com-
mercial interests – became harder to sustain as the years went by. Still, in the area 
of industrial policy, a number of analysts have continued to argue that WTO rules 
unduly constrain the ability of governments to promote economic development 
through favoring selected sectors and firms.
The controversy over the degree to which WTO membership limits the indus-
trial policy options of governments gained a new lease of life with the onset of 
the global economic crisis in 2007. That crisis saw substantial government inter-
vention of many types, including steps often associated with industrial policy. In 
fact, advocates of industrial policy, long on the back foot in many liberal-leaning 
industrial economies, have had plenty of wind in their sails as the global eco-
nomic crisis led many policymakers to conclude that national economies need to 
be “rebalanced” away from the financial sector towards manufacturing.2 If WTO 
rules do indeed constrain governments’ choices concerning industrial policies, 
then surely evidence of those constraints should be found in the period since the 
onset of the global economic crisis.3 Alternatively, if governments felt industrial 
policy was so important and chose therefore to break multilateral trade rules, 
then surely evidence from the cases brought to the WTO for dispute settlement 
would shed useful light on the real constraints facing states. In short, the global 
economic crisis and what followed may be an interesting episode for studying the 
apparent bite of the WTO’s rules.
This Special Issue of Business and Politics takes a multi-sectoral approach 
to evaluating prominent claims that multilateral trade rules presently impose 
sharp limits on national industrial policies. Overall, the evidence presented here 
suggests that claims that WTO membership rules out the use of industrial policy 
are exaggerated. Specifically, these assertions do not reflect the incomplete and 
1 Perhaps it is more accurate to infer that whatever the downside from constraints on one’s own 
policies are compensated by the benefits from constraints to trading partner’s policies.
2 Marzinotto (2012); Sperling (2012).
3 Gourevitch (1986: p. 221).
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contested nature of the WTO’s accords and the imperatives of policymaking in an 
era when many governments simultaneously intervene in national economies. 
Like food safety laws, much industrial policy emerges unscathed from WTO obli-
gations. Unlike food safety laws, the latitude in WTO rules may not necessarily be 
a desirable outcome.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe 
and contrast prominent contributions to the extensive literature contending that 
multilateral trade rules restrain government industrial policymaking. Section 3 
evaluates those claims in light of the totality of the WTO’s rules and its mecha-
nism for resolving disputes between governments. The crisis-era industrial policy 
choices of Brazil – some of which have been contested by certain of its trading 
partners – are described in Section 4 and their relevance to the matters at hand 
discussed. We then present a survey of the findings of sectoral studies published 
in this Special Issue in Section 5, followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.
2  Kicking away the ladder?4
The economies of WTO member governments differ as markedly as their diplo-
matic clout – circumstances that are likely to have influenced the negotiation of 
the existing set of binding multilateral trade rules.5 Some analysts have accused 
industrial countries that pursued industrial policies (IP) of “carving out a mul-
tilateral order which best suits their current development trajectory.”6 Chang 
and Wade have revived Friedrich List’s concept of “kicking away the ladder,” 
arguing that industrial countries used protectionist measures to get to their place 
atop the pecking order while prohibiting developing countries from following 
them by “cement[ing] the head-start advantages of their firms through the WTO 
agreements.”7
Considerable criticism of the WTO for narrowing “policy space” – a phrase 
often taken to mean the set of allowed policy choices – has rested on the binding 
and reduction of import tariffs, bans on import quotas for manufactured goods, 
limits on subsidies, a prohibition on trade-related investment measures (an 
example of which are local content requirements), and the like. If high tariffs 
are introduced as an economy enters into each industry and subsequently gradu-
ally removed in a stepwise manner, the optimal trajectory of tariffs on industrial 
4 This section draws on Aggarwal and Aggarwal (2013).
5 Rodrik (2001: p. 3).
6 Weiss (2005: p. 723).
7 Wade (2003: p. 633). See Chang (2003) on “kicking away the ladder.”
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products for late industrializers requires little harmonization across countries 
and across sectors. Following this logic, Akyuz (2005) argued that determining 
WTO commitments based on the needs of current industries, such as the binding 
of tariffs, is too static and sets back basic industrial policy, thereby jeopardizing 
technological upgrading.8
Policy space may also be further limited by the ban on export subsidies in the 
WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). However, 
considerably less attention has been given to the three types of “green light” 
subsidies that are still permitted under Article 8 of SCM agreement: “assistance 
for research and development (R&D), assistance for disadvantaged regions, 
and assistance to adapt existing facilities to meet environmental regulations.”9 
Even where subsidies are permitted, some contend that industrial country gov-
ernments can afford these financial incentives while developing countries have 
other, more pressing uses for what limited public funds are available.
The contention has been made that the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement hinders developing countries from imple-
menting IP. Wade (2003) argues that TRIPS makes it more expensive for devel-
oping countries to receive transfers of technology because of the overwhelming 
number of patents owned by industrial countries and the attendant fees charged.10 
Furthermore, the TRIPS agreement, as Wade puts it, ensures that “developing 
countries’ rights and developed countries’ obligations are unenforceable, while 
developing countries’ obligations and developed countries’ rights are enforce-
able” in part because of the high cost of using the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism.11
Gallagher (2008) aligns with Wade’s view, citing the $41 billion annual 
South-to-North transfer of profits on patents underpinned in part by WTO rules 
on intellectual property (Table 1). He also cites other studies of welfare losses 
in developing country economies that arise from the TRIPS agreement and its 
apparent implications for the cost of pharmaceuticals.12 Although extensions to 
implement the provisions of the TRIPS agreement for the Least Developed Coun-
tries have been granted on two occasions (from July 2005 to July 2013 and then 
with the most recent extension from July 2013 until 2021), this does not entirely 
counter Wade and Gallagher’s view, since only 38 very poor nations are affected 
by this extension.
8 Akyuz (2005).
9 Gallagher (2008: p. 71).
10 Wade (2003: p. 624).
11 Ibid.
12 Gallagher (2008: p. 70).
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Nevertheless, the adverse influence of TRIPS on domestic policy choices has 
been contested.13 While agreeing with Wade that TRIPS constrains policy space in 
developing countries, Gallagher points to compulsory licenses as one option that 
the TRIPS agreement explicitly permits. Under TRIPS Article 31, WTO members 
can grant a compulsory license to a domestic firm without the patent holder’s 
consent primarily within the domestic market as long as it is conditioned upon 
reasonable compensation to the rights-holder and provided the license applies 
only to the market of the granting WTO member.14 Others, such as Santos (2012), 
agree that TRIPS permit flexibilities in domestic application.15 Santos also points 
to vague standards of TRIPS such as the “requirement to engage in ‘reasonable’ 
efforts to negotiate with patent holders before overriding a patent.”16 More signifi-
cantly, and contrary to the views expressed by Wade and others, a new empirical 
study of innovation measures by DiVita (2013) finds that “the TRIPs agreement is 
always positively related to innovation and is highly statistically significant, even 
when we account the potential problem of endogeneity.”17
The WTO agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs) has been 
the target of much criticism on the grounds that it restricts IP towards foreign invest-
ment. Wade (2003) critiques the TRIMs accord for forcing governments to treat 
firms equally regardless of their national origin and because it “bans performance 
Table 1 South-North transfers of patent rents due to TRIPS.
Country   Millions of 2000 dollars
US   19,093
Germany   6768
Japan   5673
France   3326
UK   2968
Switzerland   2000
Australia   1097
Netherlands  241
Ireland   18
Total   41,184
Source: World Bank (2002).
13 See the review in DiVita (2013) of the theoretical and quantitative evidence on TRIPs and the 
implications for domestic innovation.
14 World Trade Organization (1994).
15 Santos (2012: p. 588).
16 Santos (2012: p. 589).
17 DiVita (2013).
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requirements related to local content, trade balancing, export requirements, and 
requirements on public agencies to procure goods from local suppliers (Table 2).”18 
Bora, Lloyd, and Pangestu (2000) point to the performance requirements that were 
used by East Asian countries during their rapid industrialization phase that would 
be no longer permitted under Articles III and XI of GATT, TRIPs, the multilateral 
rules on subsidies and TRIMs agreed in the Uruguay Round.19
There is also some evidence from WTO dispute settlement mechanism cases 
that suggests member governments have changed their policies to comply with 
TRIMs. For instance, China was subject to a dispute settlement proceeding in 
2006 after a complaint by the US and EU over policies towards automobile parts. 
Table 2 Categories of performance requirements.
Category   Performance requirement
Prohibited by the TRIMS agreement   Local content requirements
  Trade-balancing requirements
  Foreign exchange restrictions related to the foreign-
exchange inflows attributable to an enterprise
  Export controls
Prohibited, conditioned or discouraged 
by the IIAs at bilateral or regional levels
  Requirements to establish a joint venture with 
domestic participation
  Reqirements for a minimum level of domestic equity 
participation
  Requirements to locate headquarters for a specific 
region
  Employment requirements
  Export requirements
  Restrictions on sales of goods or services in the 
territory where they are produced or provided
  Requirements to supply goods produced or services 
provided to a specific region exclusively from a 
given territory
  Requirements to act as the sole supplier of goods 
produced or services provided
  Requirements to transfer technology, production 
processes or other proprietary knowledge
  Research and development requirements
Not restricted   All other performance requirements
Note: IIA – International Investment Agreements.
Source: UNCTAD (2003).
18 Wade (2003: p. 627).
19 Bora, Lloyd, and Pangestu (2000).
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China then changed its policies in 2009 to conform to the TRIMs agreement.20 
Interestingly, local content requirements may be making something of a revival 
since the onset of the global economic crisis, as the case studies in Hufbauer and 
others (2013) show.
Other analysts, such as Amsden and Hikino (2000), contend that apart from 
performance standards in the form of export subsidies, WTO accords do not 
prevent member governments from promoting their industries and subjecting 
them to performance standards.21 Amsden and Hikino point to the three ways in 
which the WTO allow import protection: allowing developing countries to take 
trade-restrictive measures to promote infant industries against the competition 
from aggregate imports that threaten the balance of payments (Article XVIII), 
against threats to individual industries from import surges (Article XIX on tem-
porary safeguards), or against unfair trade practices (Article VI on anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties).22
Empirical evidence on policy choice in recent years may also be of interest. A 
study by Aggarwal and Evenett (2012) examined the mix of policies implemented 
by several larger industrial and developing economies when their governments 
intervened in the aftermath of the global economic crisis.23 A large proportion 
of those interventions targeted only one sector of the economy, a hallmark of 
much industrial policy.24 In addition to showing significant cross-country vari-
ation in the propensity to discriminate against foreign commercial interests as 
well as between domestic firms, the study found that countries vary in the degree 
to which they substitute for classic trade measures (such as tariffs, antidumping 
measures, and the like) with policies less regulated by WTO rules such as “migra-
tion, bailouts and state aids, competitive devaluations, investment incentives, 
export taxes, trade finance, and steps by subnational governments and state-
owned enterprises.”25 In particular, the study finds that the worst “offenders” in 
terms of resort to discrimination against foreign commercial interests were also 
the most likely to employ state measures subject to less demanding, or no, WTO 
rules.26 This result “casts doubt on some of the strong claims in the industrial 
20 World Trade Organization (2008).
21 Amsden and Hikino (2000).
22 Amsden and Hikino (2000: p. 108).
23 Aggarwal and Evenett (2012).
24 If this finding (of considerable sector-specific intervention) is consistent with the view that 
industrial policy is alive and kicking, then this confirms and updates Rodrik’s argument that the 
death of industrial policy has been much exaggerated (Rodrik 2004).
25 Aggarwal and Evenett (2012: p. 278).
26 More will be made later of the incomplete nature of the WTO’s rules covering policies that 
could affect foreign commercial interests and the incentives to substitute between policies.
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policy literature that WTO rules impose substantial constraints on government 
intervention, at least during the crisis era.”27 Still, it could be the case that WTO 
rules may have altered the form – rather than the quantum – of state intervention 
during the recent global economic crisis.
Other analysts point to discrepancies between implications of stated WTO 
rules and their subsequent interpretation, which in turn has affected the regu-
lations actually implemented by states. Santos (2012) argues that repeat players 
which are frequently engaged in similar disputes over an extended period of time 
manage to change rule interpretations so as to advance their domestic economic 
policies within the confines of the WTO legal regime.28 They use “strategic law-
yering and litigation to pursue their policy objectives by changing rule interpre-
tation over time and by adjusting to the rule in the most favorable way possible 
and testing the boundaries of the rule.”29 Also, Santos cites various other ways 
in which states can exercise discretion such as in the case of laws on intellectual 
property “limiting the patentable subject matter, setting a high inventive step 
standard, expanding procedural opportunities to challenge patents before and 
after they are granted, and imposing limitations on injunctive remedies.”30 These 
rules create incentives for players to resort to litigation repeatedly and protract it. A 
study by DiCaprio and Gallagher (2006) that compared existing rules-based analy-
ses with a comparison of actual policy implementation aligns with Santos’ view.31 
Their findings suggest that while the covered agreements of the WTO have further 
constricted the available policy space, member countries often waited until noti-
fication or adjudication before changing policies inconsistent with international 
commitments. Therefore, they argue that the realized constraints on policy space 
are not as significant as a reading of WTO commitments might suggest.
There is also some debate over whether the effect of WTO rules is not so much in 
limiting government intervention, but rather shifting state initiatives to promoting 
the supply-side of national economies. Gallagher (2008) points to this overlooked 
option in policy space after the Uruguay Round: “what is clearly WTO legal at this 
writing is the ability to fund human capital and public infrastructure, offer tax con-
cessions to foreign firms, and provide marketing services to domestic firms…are all 
key elements of late industrialization that continue to steer clear of WTO rules.”32 
Consequently, DiCaprio and Gallagher (2006) argue, some windows for policy still 
27 Ibid.
28 Santos (2012: p. 554).
29 Santos (2012: p. 594).
30 Santos (2012: p. 598).
31 DiCaprio and Gallagher (2006).
32 Gallagher (2008: p. 82).
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remain (Table 3). Also, governments retain the authority to require foreign firms 
to transfer technology, form joint ventures, and perform R&D in the host country.
However, contrary to Gallagher’s view, Weiss (2005) argues such a multilat-
eral trading order discriminates in practice against state policies that promote 
labor and capital-intensive industries while allowing the same policies directed at 
technology- or knowledge-intensive industries.33 She notes that industrial econo-
mies, which are more reliant upon and capable in high-tech and knowledge-based 
industries, are not subject to the same constraints as developing countries whose 
skills revolve around labor- and capital-intensive industries. Labeled “Strategic 
Activism” by Weiss, governments that use subsidies to enhance technology, and 
policies such as export finance programs, infrastructure for export expansion, 
governance of science and technology priorities, and innovation and investment 
support have not been challenged in the WTO.
Some argue that the main challenges to industrial policy lie elsewhere. Gal-
lagher (2008), Shadlen (2006), and Haque (2007) claim that regional trade agree-
ments (RTAs) and international supply chains have intensified attendant policy 
trade-offs more than traditional WTO commitments. Studies show that develop-
ing countries are more likely to concede to rules relating to FDI, capital liber-
alization, IPR, labor and environmental standards when negotiating RTAs while 
collectively opposing the same measures in the WTO (Table 4). Such observations 
shift the debate from a comparison of the WTO and its predecessors to an analysis 
Table 3 Strategies of the Newly Industrialized Countries.
GATT-Compliant  Policy instrument   WTO-Compliant
□   Goods:   Tariff sequencing  
□     Import licenses  
□     Duty drawbacks   □
  Subsidies:  Export  
□     Production  
□     R&D   (actionable)
  FDI:   Local content  
□     Tech transfer   □
    Trade balancing  
□   IPRs:   Selective patents  
□     Compulsory licensing  □
□   Other:   Skills building   □
□     State-run firms   □
Source: Adapted from DiCaprio and Gallagher (2006, p. 784, table 1).
33 Weiss (2005: p. 724).
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of a somewhat constraining WTO environment and an even more constraining 
network of RTAs.34
Relatedly Haque (2007), amongst others, contends that the global markets 
in many sectors have become more concentrated and that this is a threat to the 
policy space of the developing countries.35 As global value chains give multina-
tionals the upper hand in selecting suppliers and determining their compen-
sation, it has become difficult for developing countries to sell labor-intensive 
products in foreign markets. In addition, a “race to the bottom” competition 
between developing country producers is said to have resulted in reduced wages 
and neglect for labor and environmental standards in the global market. Taken 
Table 4 Policy space for development and the WTO.
Policy instrument   Permitted  Agreement
Goods trade    
 Tariff sequencing   *   GATT
 Tax drawbacks    
Intellectual property    
 Slective permission for patents   X   TRIPS
 Short patent timelines with exceptions  X   TRIPS
 Compulsory licenses    
Subsidies    
 Export   X   SCM
 R&D   *   SCM
 Distribution   *   SCM
 Environment   *   SCM
 Cost of capital    
FDI    
 Local contents   X   GATT, TRIMS
 Trade balancing   X   TRIMS
 Joint ventures    
 Technology transfer    
 R&D    
 Employment and local personnel    
 Tax concessions    
Other    
 Human capital    
 Administrative guidance    
 Movement of people     GATS
 Provision of infrastructure    
Source: Gallagher (2008).
34 For specifics, see Figure 1 Weiss (2005: p. 728).
35 Haque (2007).
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together, then, the challenges to industrial policy posed by global supply chains 
and far-reaching regional trade agreements may be more significant than the 
tightening of WTO rules.
In the light of the above arguments, it would appear that countries may have 
more leeway than critics of the WTO, such as Rodrik36 and Wade, imply. Yet as we 
have seen, even aggressive interveners, such as China, have been subject to some 
WTO disciplines and associated dispute settlement actions as well as potentially 
finding new ways to circumvent these rules. Moreover, even countries that are 
fully complying with provisions of the WTO still have options to develop clusters, 
promote research and development, and promote the integration of their firms 
into world markets.
3   The bite of WTO rules as if the totality of the 
WTO system mattered
The image conjured up by much of the literature on developing countries and 
industrial policy that is critical of the WTO is that the limited negotiating lever-
age of the governments of these countries during the Uruguay Round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations resulted in them signing a range of binding accords 
that substantially reduced the range of policy options that could be deployed to 
promote economic development. Even though there is substitutability between 
policy instruments, presumably we are to assume that the reduction in available 
policies is material in some significant sense to the attainment of the objectives of 
industrial policy. Moreover, for policy to be constrained by WTO rules those rules 
must be adhered to, so implicit assumptions about the credibility and effective-
ness of the enforcement of WTO rules are being made as well. In this section we 
unpick the assumptions underlying this critique, drawing upon evidence and an 
understanding of the totality of the WTO system including the operation of its 
Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Even though developing countries are often lumped together as a group in 
critiques of the impact of WTO rules on industrial policy, with respect to certain 
trade policy instruments – notably tariffs, perhaps the most basic trade policy 
instrument of all – there is in fact considerable variation across developing coun-
tries in the degree to which current policy is constrained by WTO rules. Critics of 
the WTO would do well to consult the WTO’s publication, World Tariff Profiles, 
36 Rodrik, for example, has argued “… a strategy based on integration crowds out alternatives 
that may be more development-friendly” (Rodrik 2001: p. 32).
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which is published annually.37 According to the latest version available, in 2012 
there was substantial variation across developing countries in the percentage of 
tariff lines that are bound at the WTO in the first place. For example, it is a fact 
that 29 developing country WTO members have bound less than half of their tariff 
lines, implying substantial freedom to raise tariffs. On the other hand, most Latin 
American countries that are members of the WTO have bound all, or nearly all, 
of their tariff lines.
Significant variation also exists across the WTO membership in the differ-
ence between the average applied tariff rate and the maximum allowed (or 
bound) tariff rates. When such differences are sizeable, governments have plenty 
of room to raise tariffs should the need arise. Indeed, before the global economic 
crisis struck it has been estimated that 85 WTO members could have raised their 
applied average tariff rates by as much as the Smoot Hawley increase undertaken 
by the US during the 1930s and still not exceeded their average bound rates, 
thereby technically adhering to their WTO obligations.38
One flaw, then, in the critics’ argument is that of over-generalization. The 
constraints, such as they are, facing developing countries’ industrial policy-
making are not uniform. Another source of non-uniformity is the treatment of 
countries that have acceded to the WTO since 1995, many of whom have taken on 
obligations in excess of GATT members that signed the Uruguay Round.39 Given 
what is known about the asymmetric nature of the bargaining process leading 
to WTO accession, in principle a stronger case can be made that there are more 
significant multilateral limits on these countries’ policy space. Of course, greater 
constraint need not imply that that level of constraint is material, and even then, 
the assessment of material impact may vary across sectors.
The failure to consider the incompleteness of WTO disciplines is the second 
flaw in the critics’ argument. For better or for worse, much has been made of 
the importance of state contracts and procurement policy as an instrument of 
industrial policy. Yet, the WTO’s Agreement of Government Procurement (GPA) 
is a plurilateral accord, that is, one where members can choose whether to join. 
Many developing countries have chosen not to – so many in fact that the recent 
revision to the GPA was driven in part by a desire to encourage developing coun-
tries to accede. Since money is fungible, government contracts can be used to 
support all sorts of ancillary activities, some of which may be the targets of indus-
trial policymaking.
37 This document is available at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles13_ 
e.pdf.
38 Evenett (2012).
39 Evenett and Primo-Braga (2009).
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Another policy domain not covered by WTO accords are exchange rates. The 
latter is significant as a number of countries in their fast growth, catch-up phase 
have been accused by trading partners of maintaining under-valued exchange 
rates so as to promote national exports, arguably a form of industrial policy. In 
the light of the incompleteness of WTO accords and given the substitutability 
between industrial policy instruments, considerable care is needed before con-
cluding that restrictions on a partial set of state measures materially limits the 
ability of a government to promote preferred firms or sectors.40
The third flaw in many critics’ arguments involves making often-implicit 
assumptions about the WTO’s strength. These include: (a) that WTO rules result 
in compliance; (b) that non-compliance would lead to WTO dispute settlement; 
and (c) that the threat of sanctions that follows an adverse dispute settlement 
ruling would result in a WTO member taking steps to come back into compli-
ance. Each of these three assumptions can be challenged. That these assump-
tions tend not to be challenged may reflect implicit acceptance of the tenets of 
the rules-cum-compliance mind-set of Western public international law. Rather 
than address such matters solely in normative terms, it is preferable to examine 
the incentives associated with the decisions associated with each assumption (a) 
through (c).
What are the costs and benefits of compliance, taking account of the prob-
ability of detection (a not insignificant matter given the prevalence of much non-
transparent or murky protectionism)? Under what circumstances will a trading 
partner bring a dispute to the WTO? Perhaps the trading partner already had 
leverage over the offending WTO member (through bilateral aid or military or 
diplomatic support), in which case the coming into force of the Uruguay Round 
Dispute Settlement Understanding may not have altered incentives to comply? 
Perhaps the trading partner too has broken WTO rules, fears counter-retaliation, 
and will not bring a case in the first place (a feature referred to elsewhere as the 
“glass houses syndrome”41)?
Even if sanctions are allowed following a dispute settlement victory, the 
offending nation may be prepared to suffer the associated harm done by the sanc-
tions or, as is allowed under WTO rules, offer some other form of compensation. 
In this case, the offending industrial policy measure will not be removed, calling 
into question what bite the WTO accord had in the first place. In short, as the 
saying goes, there is many a slip between cup and lip. Just because a binding rule 
exists does not mean it has bite, especially at a time of global economic crisis 
40 Corporate reorganisation – through mergers and acquisitions – is another tool of industrial 
policy not covered by a separate WTO accord (in this case on competition law).
41 See Evenett (2012).
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when many governments are simultaneously under pressure to intervene in favor 
of certain sectors or commercial interests.
The section highlights three flaws often made in assessments of the impact 
of WTO rules on policy choice. WTO rules relate to only a subset of the policies 
typically associated with industrial policy. WTO rules do not exist to prevent state 
intervention per se, typically discouraging certain forms of intervention that harm 
certain (not necessarily all forms of) foreign commercial interests. And even when 
binding WTO rules exist, their enforcement is not undertaken by an independ-
ent referee, but rather by self-interested and adversely affected WTO members 
that may have cut corners, in particular during periods of acute economic stress. 
These reasons call into question just how much bite WTO rules really have, a 
point that has become all too apparent since the onset of the global economic 
crisis as the following case study of Brazil demonstrates.
4  Crisis-era industrial policy in Brazil
The recent global economic crisis presents an interesting opportunity to assess 
the extent to which WTO rules may have influenced the manner in which govern-
ments chose to intervene to restore their economies’ health. Given the severity 
of the downturn, which in the case of Brazil saw a real GDP growth rate of 5.2% 
in 2008 turn into a contraction of 0.3% in 2009, the pressures for intervention in 
many societies, both industrialized and developing, were acute. Surely, if govern-
ments felt constrained in their industrial policy formation by WTO rules, then it 
would show up in the years 2009 and beyond. If not then, when?
This section describes several Brazilian WTO-related crisis-era industrial 
policy responses. Several reasons account for the focus on Brazil. First, Brazil 
is large enough to matter, economically speaking. After all, it is a member of the 
BRICS group and is the dominant economic power in its region. Second, Brazil 
has a well-regarded diplomatic service and claims of ignorance of WTO rules can 
be dispensed with. Brazil’s diplomats know the rules of the game and its trading 
partners know that too.
Third, in August 2011 Brazil adopted a new industrial policy titled Plano 
Brasil Maior and, given this paper was written in 2014, enough time has passed 
to start assessing what steps have been taken. Of course, it could be argued that 
in the absence of WTO rules Brazil would have undertaken a different industrial 
policy. However, there are enough choices in the Plano Brasil Maior that shed 
light on some of the considerations raised earlier in this paper. For our current 
purpose, perhaps the most useful document concerning the Plano is the WTO 
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secretariat’s Trade Policy Review42 of Brazil, the revised report of which was pub-
lished on 26 July 2013. That report was published after consultations with the 
Brazilian authorities. In public statements concerning the Review, while the 
latter certainly did not share the WTO secretariat’s assessment of every fact, they 
did not contest the facts reported. As will become clear, Brazil’s interpretation of 
some facts was also at odds with a number of trading partners.
Following a deterioration in the competitiveness of Brazilian manufacturing 
industry, which resulted in a sizeable merchandise trade deficit, Brasilia adopted 
a sequence of two industrial policies, the second of which covered the years 
2011 to 2014 and was known as the Plano Brasil Maior.43 The WTO’s Trade Policy 
Review makes no less than 44 references to the Plano. These include the follow-
ing statements, the first of which concerns a potential local content requirement 
in a high-profile sector of the Brazilian economy:
Under the Plano Brasil Maior, the Government adopted significant fiscal incentives to help the 
domestic auto industry recover from the effects of the global crisis. Between December 2011 
and December 2012, tax breaks were offered for companies producing vehicles with more than 
65% of regional content. As from 1 February 2013, the automobile sector’s fiscal regime was 
superseded by the INOVAR-AUTO programme. Companies eligible for the programme may 
benefit from an Industrial Products Tax reduction of up to 30%. In order to qualify for the 
programme vehicle manufacturers must comply with energy-efficiency requirements and with 
certain domestic manufacturing or investment conditions.44
Taxation of imports has been increased as part of the Plano as this comment shows:
As part of tax reforms under the Plano Brasil Maior, the COFINS rate [a tax to finance the 
national social security program] on imported goods falling under some 3300 tariff lines has 
been increased from 1 to 2 percentage points.45
Given the above statement, it is worth noting that in 2012 Brazil’s import regime 
had 10,031 tariff lines. This broad-based increase in the taxation of imports has 
been followed by other more targeted tariff increases.46 In addition to raising 
import-related charges:
42 WTO document WT/TPR/S/283/Rev.1.
43 WTO (2013: p. 12). For further information concerning this industrial policy initiative from a 
Brazilian government source see http://www.brasilmaior.mdic.gov.br/.
44 WTO (2013: p. 12).
45 WTO (2013: p. 57).
46 For example in October 2012, consistent with the leeway allowed under MERCOSUR’s rules, 
Brazil raised the tariffs on 100 tariff lines between 6% and 23% (WTO 2013: p. 52). In March 2013 
the members of MERCOSUR agreed to expand the number of tariff lines where tariffs departed 
from the common external tariff from 100 to 200.
496      Vinod K. Aggarwal and Simon J. Evenett
Trade defense has been identified as a component of the Plano Brasil Maior, pursuant to 
which a number of steps have been taken to strengthen trade defense. Brazil has announced 
its intentions to increase the number of trade remedy investigators, and has implemented 
changes to certain procedures….The number of Brazil’s AD [anti-dumping] investigations and 
measures in force has been increasing since the last review period; Brazil has become some-
what more active in initiating countervail (CV) investigations, and in 2012 initiated its first 
safeguard investigation since 2008.47
Steps were also taken to promote exports:
In the framework of the Plano Brasil Maior, in April 2012 the Federal Government announced 
a number of measures to increase the competitiveness of Brazil’s exports, partly affected by 
the appreciation of the Brazilian real. These measures include a substantial increase in the 
resources allocated to PROEX [a scheme to subsidize export credit], from R$1.2 billion to R$3.1 
billion…48
More generally, the Plano resulted in a substantial increase in the amount of finan-
cial resources made available to Brazilian firms operating in tradable sectors. The 
WTO Trade Policy Review notes:
The Plano Brasil Maior has also amplified a number of programmes aimed at providing 
support to producers and exporters of manufactured products. The BNDES [the state-owned 
development bank] Programme for the Sustainability of Investment (PSI) was extended until 
31 December 2012 and its budget was increased to R$227 billion. The PSI finances the produc-
tion, acquisition, and export of capital goods through four different subprogrammes….
Brazilian exports of manufactured goods are eligible for a number of export finance program-
mes run by the Banco de Brasil (PROEX) and the BNDES (EXIM, REVITALIZE EXPORTS).49
It is worth noting that automatic access to BNDES export financing schemes is 
conditional on meeting certain levels of locally procured content.
Brazil is not a member of the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement 
that, in principle at least, bans the use of price preferences for domestically-pro-
duced goods. In this respect, the following comment in the WTO’s Trade Policy 
Review is of interest:
The Plano Brasil Maior comprises a wide range of measures, some of which may have an effect 
on trade. For instance, in procurement policy, the Government introduced preferential margins 
of up to 25% for certain domestic goods and services, including several manufactured goods.50
47 WTO (2013: p. 59). Further details of the changes in Brazil’s antidumping regime were given 
the following pages of this report.
48 WTO (2013: p. 76).
49 WTO (2013: p. 135).
50 WTO (2013: p. 133).
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This characterization of Brazil’s crisis-era industrial policy highlights the rele-
vance of some of the points made in the previous section and, more importantly, 
reinforces the argument that the constraints imposed by WTO membership on 
industrial policymaking may not be as severe as some have claimed. After all, 
Brazil’s ramping up of its export credits and more restrictive government procure-
ment policies implicate state measures that fall outside of its multilateral trade 
obligations. Moreover, Brazil is allowed to amend its trade defense regime so long 
as it conforms with the existing WTO accords. (Of course, few nations reform their 
trade defense regime in the liberalizing direction, so that possibility can be fairly 
confidently set aside.)
The contested nature of Brazil’s WTO obligations is highlighted by its fiscal 
incentives in the automobile sector. As in the case of export finance incentives, 
the tax break on offer to those selling automobiles can be obtained in more than 
one way. According to the Brazilian authorities, one means of satisfying the con-
ditions for the tax break involves, amongst other conditions, production in Brazil. 
Another means does not involve production in Brazil but other forms of invest-
ment (specifically in research and development). In this manner, then, Brazil can 
claim that producing or sourcing local is not necessarily required to attain the 
fiscal incentive on offer. Still, as demonstrated by the questions posed to Brazil 
during official meetings associated with its WTO Trade Policy Review,51 some 
industrial countries signaled that, in their view, this approach was at odds with 
multilateral trade rules.
Subsequently, in December 2013, the European Union initiated proceedings 
under the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding against Brazil concern-
ing these automobile sector-related fiscal incentives, amongst other matters. 
 Argentina, Japan, and the US have also joined this dispute as complainants. If 
Brazil prevails in dispute settlement, this measure need not be altered. If Brazil 
is found to be in violation of WTO rules – a decision that given the typical dura-
tion of a WTO dispute would in all likelihood be rendered effectively 5 years after 
the inception of the Plano Brasil Maior – even then Brazil has options other than 
reversing this element of its industrial policy.
In sum, Brazil, a large developing country that presumably knows its actions 
cannot escape notice, revised its industrial policy during a period of acute global 
economic stress in a manner that increased the discrimination against foreign 
commercial interests. For sure, one element of those changes is now being con-
tested by leading economic powers, but much of Brazil’s Plano either fell outside 
WTO rules or exploited the considerable leeway in those WTO rules that allow for 
51 See WTO document WT/TPR/M/283/Add.1.
498      Vinod K. Aggarwal and Simon J. Evenett
the imposition of protectionism. Even if Brazil has to revise some of its industrial 
policy following adverse WTO dispute settlement rulings, that policy is likely to 
have been in effect for several years and can no doubt be replaced by another 
form of less-than-transparent government intervention. If necessary, the cycle of 
non- or partial-compliance can begin anew.
5   Insights from sectoral studies of crisis-era  
industrial policies
This Special Issue contains five articles that focus on crisis-era industrial policy 
developments within a particular sector. The sectors were chosen because of their 
high profile, either because of their current economic heft (automobiles, finance, 
petroleum, wide-bodied aircraft) or their potential (the wind sector). In each 
analysis, crisis-era state intervention is set in its appropriate context, which often 
includes a track record of firm- and sector-specific favoritism from before the 
onset of the global economic crisis. These articles, then, do not advance the thesis 
that industrial policy is novel. Rather, they examine the degree to which WTO 
rules and other factors shaped the design, implementation, and trade partner 
reaction to crisis-era government intervention in these sectors.
Once the extent to which national economies were contracting became clear 
in 2009, many governments in industrial countries sought to restore economic 
growth through fiscal stimulus packages and measures to support the expansion 
of so-called growth poles. One such pole included the development of energy 
sources other than fossil fuels and the moniker “promoting green growth” was 
applied. According to Lewis (2014), the wind power industry is largely supported 
by a mix of industrial policies including direct subsidization, local content 
requirements, financial and tax incentives. Examples of the latter include the 
expansion of the U.S. Federal Production Tax Credit to include an Investment Tax 
Credit or straight cash payment, while China and Germany maintained feed-in 
tariffs.52
Lewis’ article discusses the specific industrial structure of the wind sector, post-
financial crisis resort to subsidies in the wind sector, fiscal stimulus support, and 
other interventions, including a general trend towards protectionist policies, such 
as tariff increases, trade finance, export restrictions, bailouts, and local content 
requirements. With increasing competition in the wind power industry, there also 
has been an increase in trade policy friction between governments, which has 
52 Lewis (2014: pp. 511–547).
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manifested itself in WTO disputes, resort to so-called trade remedies, and meas-
ures apparently inconsistent with WTO rules, such as local content requirements. 
To back up the claims made in this article, evidence is presented on various wind 
energy support mechanisms for many developing and industrial countries.
Lewis examines the WTO disputes brought against Canada and China for 
their interventions in the wind power industry. Before concluding that WTO 
rules can tame national industrial policy, however, it is worth noting that many 
wind sector interventions by other governments (in the BRICS, France, the US, 
and Spain, for example) have gone unchallenged. For example, Brazil’s initial 
PROINFA scheme that required a 60% local content requirement has now been 
removed, but there is still a “nationalization index” used to access funding from 
the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) and a high import tariff on 
foreign wind turbines.53 Moreover, in China, after local content requirements were 
removed, Chinese firms still dominate the market and are perceived by foreign 
firms as receiving preferential treatment for projects.54
Such persistent “opaque” preferences for the use of local materials or for 
local firms demonstrate, it is argued, the ample remaining policy space for the 
wind power industry. Therefore, with the exception of the post-crisis period 
around 2009 when “variety of market factors have sharpened competition,” and 
the governments needed “to garner political support for renewable energy tech-
nologies with a promise of job creation and domestic technological progress,” 
countries continue to practice industrial policies at the expense of foreign com-
mercial interests.55
The petroleum sector saw considerable state intervention in recent years as 
well, as Lin’s article in this Special Issue shows. Lin (2014) presents case studies 
of the UK, representative of advanced economies that focuses on the use of post-
tax subsidies and China, representative of emerging economies that focuses on 
pre-tax subsidies (with consumers paying prices below that of the supply and 
distribution costs), to illustrate various means of subsidy-centered intervention 
in petroleum industry. Lin “relied on the Global Trade Alert to track various forms 
of subsidization that might not have been captured in WTO datasets, pointing to 
the limitations of the global trading and investment regimes in identifying major 
forms of protectionism” in petroleum industry since 2008.56
Moreover, Lin examined interventions by governments with extensive 
petroleum resources. For instance, Russia increased export duties of crude and 
53 Lewis (2014: pp. 511–547).
54 Lewis (2014: pp. 511–547).
55 Lewis (2014: pp. 511–547).
56 Lin (2014: pp. 549–578).
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finished oil products in May and June 2011 when the export tax reached nearly 
US$50 a barrel and imposed oil export duties on its customs union partner 
Belarus.57 Also under the Russian Energy Plan to 2030, the Central Bank of Russia 
was asked to refinance bank loans for the privileged firms.58 After reviewing these 
and other interventions, Lin observes that attempts to “capture profit of high oil 
prices through various means of contractual and regulatory changes have proven 
mostly ineffective and contra-WTO.”59
UK industrial policy towards the petroleum sector now includes “lock-in sub-
sidies for fossil fuels and an increasing resort to a range of gray area incentives 
including tax breaks for exploration for unconventional fossil fuels and over-
seas investment financing” according to Lin.60 The 2013 UK Oil and Gas Indus-
trial Policy calls on the government to identify British interests along the supply 
chain and enact incentives accordingly, including requirements for local con-
tracts, local content, fabrication, and incentives for firm internationalization and 
export, Lin is concerned that such measures would potentially be “contradictory 
to the rules of the WTO.”61
Developing economies deploy industrial policy in this industry as well. In 
China, consistent with the terms of its Protocol of Accession to the WTO, the 
importation of petroleum is still reserved for state trading enterprises.62 Since 
2000, governmental steps have sought to boost the profitability of national oil 
companies with a model of “privileged corporation” that consists of a mix of price 
controls, low tax and dividend demands, investment promotion, and continual 
asset restructuring to transfer value.63 The government also “provides favorable 
input prices and transfers assets to favored firms at prices that are below market 
value.”64 For instance, Chinese subsidies for PetroChina Ltd. in 2007 totaled RMB 
37,476.7 million ($4927.4 million) and tax reductions included tax preferences, 
adjustments in depreciation and amortization bases and Value-Added Taxes 
(VAT) deductions.65
With respect to the question of whether WTO rules constrain the practice 
of industrial policy in this sector, Lin addresses this matter indirectly. Lin notes 
that the energy sector is not subject to sector-specific WTO rules and in his view 
57 Lin (2014: pp. 549–578).
58 Lin (2014: pp. 549–578).
59 Lin (2014: pp. 549–578).
60 Lin (2014: pp. 549–578).
61 Lin (2014: pp. 549–578).
62 Lin (2014: pp. 549–578).
63 Lin (2014: pp. 549–578).
64 Lin (2014: pp. 549–578).
65 Lin (2014: pp. 549–578).
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the regulation of energy in international law is “highly fragmented and largely 
incoherent.”66 Moreover, Lin observes “WTO members have so far undertook very 
limited commitments to grant access to their energy markets to foreign service 
operators nonetheless.”67 The incompleteness of WTO rules is compounded by 
ambiguity over the legal status of energy as a good or service, both of which cast 
doubt on any claim that the room to practice industrial policies, including those 
with protectionist elements, in petroleum industry is precluded by existing mul-
tilateral trade rules.
The onset of the recent global economic crisis is rightly associated with finan-
cial market dysfunction and Young’s article in this Special Issue examines gov-
ernment intervention in this critical sector of national economies. Young (2014) 
analyzes the extensive government intervention in banking industry during the 
global financial crisis of 2008–2009 when some countries deployed resources 
valued in excess of 40% of their GDPs to save their national banks.68 This article 
documents the empirical record and examines different types of financial protec-
tionism in the banking industry since the crisis and assesses centrality of each 
country in the international banking network.
While policymakers may emphasize the goal of restoring financial stability as 
the purpose of state intervention in this sector, as Young shows, a dispassionate 
assessment would also point to the ways in which governments have intervened 
that go beyond this laudable goal to include both sector-specific and firm-specific 
favoritism. In particular, Young identifies three features of intervention in this 
sector: market entry restrictions, asymmetric treatment of domestic and foreign 
firms, and government subsidies, such as bailouts.
Young finds that the form of financial protectionism employed is associated 
with countries’ centrality to the international financial system, but not with other 
forms of industrial policy nor with other aspects of the national business envi-
ronment, such as the level of financial liberalization in the country.69 Moreover, 
in interpreting the evidence he marshals, Young concludes that states seek out 
ways to engage in industrial policies even when there are incentives or rules that 
discourage protectionism.70
It has long been recognized that industrial policies in the production of wide-
bodied aircraft have the potential to distort trade and investment flows. Indeed, 
an agreement relating specifically to this sector was negotiated by GATT members 
66 Cottier et al. (2011).
67 Cottier et al. (2011).
68 Young (2014: pp. 579–613).
69 Young (2014: pp. 579–613).
70 Young (2014: pp. 579–613).
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as part of the Tokyo Round in the 1970s. Subsequent understandings between the 
European Union and the US, the home bases of Airbus and Boeing, respectively, 
have been negotiated. Furthermore, disputes at the WTO between these jurisdic-
tions as well as between Canada and Brazil, add further to the ways in which multi-
lateral trade rules could potentially have influenced industrial policy in this sector. 
In his article in this Special Issue, McGuire examines these matters, as well as some 
perhaps less well known industrial policy developments in other countries.
Before documenting the government intervention in commercial aircraft 
industry since the onset of the global financial crisis, McGuire summarizes rele-
vant features of the industrial organization of this sector. Thus he describes the 
structure of aircraft industry that has “high risk nature militating against private 
sector investment” and complex design that makes government intervention and 
support almost inevitable, as the Appellate Body of the WTO also noted in respect 
of European government support for Airbus.71
Then, McGuire describes and assesses national industrial policies in this 
sector through the lens of Global Value Chains (GVCs). McGuire shows that, in the 
lower tier of the aircraft industry where parts and components are made, there 
are low barriers to entry as a result of the products in question being standardized 
and market-based forms of governance, such as liberal trade policies or adher-
ence to international standards, bite.72 In contrast, McGuire shows that at the 
top-tier level of the industry there are considerable barriers such as “high non-
recurring costs of aircraft development.”73 In this part of the GVC incumbents are 
granted advantages, and the government intervention may be necessary to help 
the new entrants.74
Although small in number, the WTO rulings on the Airbus-Boeing and Bom-
bardier-Embraer cases show that industrial policy in this sector is susceptible to 
legal action. In fact, McGuire argues that direct grants are now rare and export 
subsidies are more strictly controlled in the aircraft industry; in other words, such 
rulings do appear to have some effect in reducing certain forms of direct gov-
ernment support, such as export finance.75 These rulings may also have resulted 
in the substitution of one policy for another. As McGuire shows, countries now 
pursue more diffuse sectoral support, such as for R&D on composite technolo-
gies, according to evidence he has assembled from the Global Trade Alert (GTA) 
database.76
71 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
72 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
73 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
74 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
75 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
76 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
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For instance, both China and Russia are developing, with state support, prod-
ucts at top-tier level that could compete with Boeing and Airbus. The Russian 
state has provided a range of financial support, including direct cash injections 
into Sukhoi and Oboronoprom in 2009.77 In addition, in 2011, a version of the 
“cash for clunkers” programs that gave airlines subsidies for new aircraft pur-
chases was used by the Russian government to support Sukhoi’s domestic sales.78 
Although the largest cash subsidy went to the largest and newest regional jets, 
Sukhoi, these measures may well be WTO rule-compliant since they were also 
made available for the purchase of non-Russian made aircraft.79
China, on the other hand, made use of state banks to offer guarantees or 
other forms of finance for aerospace projects, such as “some $2.8 billion in start-
up capital” that followed government approval of the C919 program, the devel-
opment of new civil aircraft in China.80 Responding to these incentives and its 
broader regional economic development implications, local and regional Chinese 
officials have made many Chinese regional airlines act as customers for Commer-
cial Aviation Company of China (COMAC)’s jets.81
Although the record points to extensive government intervention in tier-one 
of this industry, lower tiers show otherwise. In fact, McGuire shows that Mexico, 
which occupies second- and third-tier places in the supply chain, is not deploy-
ing protectionist measures and, if anything, its policies demonstrates the merits 
of openness and liberalization and clear limits to the reach of industrial policy.82 
Overall, then, industrial policy measures are still needed to overcome significant 
barriers to entry in the upper-tier of the sector and governments are likely to seek 
means to accomplish this goal. Although governments restrain themselves some-
what, resort to research and development subsidies and the like – the former at 
least is arguably allowed under WTO rules – is likely to continue.
Automobiles represent one of the most significant sectors in the global 
economy and, taken together, cross-border trade in parts, components, and final 
cars exceeds a trillion US dollars. In her article in this Special Issue, Oh examines 
the ways in which nations have used industrial policy to revive and restructure 
the automotive industry since the onset of the global economic crisis by conduct-
ing case studies of China, France, and the US. Countries have employed indus-
trial policies ranging from tax relief or subsidies to direct involvement in industry 
77 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
78 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
79 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
80 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
81 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
82 McGuire (2014: pp. 615–639).
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restructuring plans to revive their auto industries in the wake of the financial 
market crash.83
The political justification for state intervention in the auto industry has 
focused on fixing market failures and structural coordination problems, as 
well as providing innovation-driven initiatives.84 In fact, Oh argues many WTO 
member states have employed “murky” protectionist measures, such as the use 
of bailouts with strings attached, public procurement measures, and quantitative 
restrictions on imports. So widespread is this intervention that Oh argues there 
is little “legitimate motivation” for a member to challenge other nations’ subsidy 
programs at the WTO.85
For example, Oh shows that the U.S. bailouts for GM and Chrysler, although 
criticized at the time as discriminating against foreign automakers, served as a 
precedent upon which other countries have justified their own interventions in 
this sector.86 Facing significant demands at the national level for intervention, 
even the European Commission had to temporarily relax it strict rules against 
commerce-distorting financial assistance to companies. Consequently, the 
French government provided bailouts of €3 billion ($3.9 billion) to both Peugeot 
and Renault in exchange for not restructuring: halting layoffs, halting plans to 
move production abroad, and suspending factory closures in France for the dura-
tion of the bailouts.87 As a result, in 2010, Renault was forced to drop its plan of 
outsourcing the production of its subcompact car to Turkey.88
China’s entry to the WTO, and subsequent trade disputes in this sector, suggest 
that developing countries’ industrial policies in the automotive industry are influ-
enced more often by WTO rules. For instance, after joining the WTO, “China not 
only abandoned the local content requirement that had been employed for nearly 
two decades, but also lowered the tariff on imported cars from 80–100 to 25% and 
that on imported parts and components from 15–50 to 10% by July 2006.”89 Also, 
“complying with TRIMs rendered China to eliminate performance requirements 
imposed on foreign investors, such as subsidizing export performance, creating 
local content requirements, and maintaining separate regulations for domestic 
and imported products.”90 Still, China faced trade disputes in 2006 with the US, 
followed by the E.U. and Canada, which contested China’s tariffs on imported 
83 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
84 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
85 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
86 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
87 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
88 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
89 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
90 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
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cars [the Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (DS 340)].91 This rep-
resented the first case in which China let the dispute go through the full panel 
process as well as the first time it implemented an adverse WTO ruling.92
Nevertheless, Oh contends that domestic policy space still exists allowing 
for the exercise of industrial policy in automotive industry. Again referring to the 
case of China, Oh shows that although the disputes in 2006 have forced the gov-
ernment to remove a measure that placed higher tariffs on imported automotive 
parts, the ruling probably had virtually no effect since manufacturing of the auto-
motive parts already operated in China in localized supply chains by both foreign 
and domestic firms.93 Oh calls this strategy, whereby governments implement 
industrial policies and only to remove them after coming into dispute at the WTO, 
as “convenient compliance.”94 Overall, then, although existing WTO rules can be 
used to challenge the use of certain industrial policies in the automotive industry, 
Oh finds that countries have found ways to circumvent these rules through alter-
native mechanisms or from refraining from bringing cases in the first place out of 
the fear of retaliation.
The articles in this Special Issue bear out many of the points we made 
earlier. Moreover, the range of policies examined in those articles overlap sig-
nificantly with those pursued by Brazil that were documented in last section’s 
case study, implying that the crisis-era industrial policy response by Brazil may 
not be that unusual. Overall, while important details certain vary across the 
sectoral  contributions to this Special Issue, a finding that is common to all is 
that extensive  sector-specific government intervention has been a hallmark of 
the crisis response of many governments. As far as these leading sectors of the 
global economy are concerned, industrial policy is alive and kicking. This may 
not provide particularly fertile ground for critics of the WTO to show that existing 
multilateral trade rules prevented governments from adopting industrial policies 
that would have had a greater impact during the global economic crisis.
6  Concluding remarks
In 2015 the World Trade Organization will be 20 years old. Since its infancy, the 
WTO has been criticized by certain academics, analysts, competing international 
organizations (such as the notably less influential United Nations Conference on 
91 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
92 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
93 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
94 Oh (2014: pp. 641–665).
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Trade and Development), development ministries and aid agencies, and non-
governmental organizations as limiting the industrial policy options of WTO 
members, in particular, those of developing countries. Evocative metaphors, 
such as “Kicking Away The Ladder,” have been deployed by those critical of the 
Uruguay Round multilateral trade accords. The impasse of the Doha Round and 
the global economic crisis have put wind in the sails of the WTO’s critics and the 
proponents of industrial policy. The purpose of this article has been to critically 
evaluate the substance of this particular critique of existing WTO accords.
A review of the literature critical of the WTO identified disparate and argu-
ably contradictory views, including claims that have already been contested with 
evidence by other analysts. More importantly, the critics appear to have too gener-
ous a view of the operation of the WTO and too expansive a view of the reach of its 
accords. As argued above, both can be contested and many doubts appear when 
the incompleteness of those accords and the incentives of the WTO’s dispute set-
tlement procedure are properly taken into account. One important misconception 
is that in a fundamental area of commercial policy, such as tariffs, developing 
countries face similar constraints. In fact, many developing countries have sig-
nificant freedom to raise their tariffs without breaking WTO rules. Such freedom 
is hard to reconcile with the rhetoric of constraint.
Moreover, as our case study of Brazil has demonstrated, even a high profile 
developing country has been able to exploit the WTO’s existing rules – both the 
latitude contained therein as well as their incompleteness – to implement far-
reaching industrial policy responses to the recent global economic crisis. If the 
WTO’s apparently tough rules limit government choice, surely they would have 
done in the years since 2007, when many states were at their most desperate to 
revive their economies. Further research is needed into crisis-era policy choice 
to see what, if any, limits were really imposed by WTO membership during this 
critical time.
To be clear, the aim of this Special Issue (and this essay) is not to take a 
position on the efficacy of industrial policy – the numerous pros and cons of 
such policies have been effectively surveyed elsewhere.95 Our focus, instead, is 
on the implications of binding multilateral trade accords for policy choice rather 
than whether state intervention makes sense. This issue draws upon sectoral, 
national, and cross-country evidence concerning policy choices since the onset 
of global economic crisis when desperate policymakers – and the commercial 
and societal interests that seek to influence them – probably faced considerable 
temptation to violate multilateral trade obligations. Put most mildly, our con-
clusion from this project is that the tensions between industrial policymaking 
95 Crafts (2013) and Wade (2014).
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and compliance with WTO rules may not be as severe as some have argued. The 
WTO has not gutted national policies towards food safety, nor it seems has it 
eviscerated national industrial policy at a time when governments intervened 
aggressively.
A reorientation of deliberations and research on the current and potential 
future relationship between industrial policy and WTO disciplines is called for. 
In fact, the area of food and product safety affords a promising place to start. 
The WTO agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures and Technical 
Barriers to Trade do not question the merits of non-efficiency objectives. Indeed 
both accords permit deviations from the WTO principles on non-discrimination 
on certain agreed, non-protectionist, transparent, and scientifically-defensible 
grounds. Deviations can be time-limited and subject to review on objective crite-
ria. This serves as a reminder that reconciling the legitimate objectives of govern-
ment policy with the tenets of non-discrimination is something trade negotiators 
and certain analysts have been thinking through for decades, a point that advo-
cates of industrial policy might wish to dwell upon. This is not to say that food 
and product safety accords at the WTO work perfectly, and indeed there may be 
important lessons to be learned in this respect for the design of potential WTO 
rules implicating industrial policy choice. Still, there may be more common 
ground here than readers of the extant literature might be led to believe, a point 
that will grow in importance if the pendulum continues to swing away from neo-
liberal ideas that shaped much economic policymaking in the years before the 
global economic crisis.
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